We show how to efficiently provide differentially private answers to counting queries (or integer-valued low-sensitivity queries) by adding discrete Gaussian noise, with essentially the same privacy and accuracy as the continuous Gaussian.
Introduction
Differential Privacy [DMNS06; DKMMN06] provides a rigorous standard for ensuring that the output of an algorithm does not leak the private details of individuals contained in its input. A standard technique for ensuring differential privacy is to evaluate a function on the input and then add random noise to the value before releasing it. Specifically, it is common to add noise drawn from a Laplace or Gaussian distribution which is scaled according to the sensitivity of the function.
However, these are both continuous distributions and it is not possible to produce or even represent a sample from them on a finite computer. Thus we must work with an approximation. Mironov [Mir12] demonstrated that naïve use of finite-precision approximations can result in a catastrophic failure of differential privacy. Thus, in order for differentially private algorithms to be used in practice, we must carefully consider how to implement them on finite computers that cannot faithfully represent real numbers.
This problem can be solved by moving to a discrete distribution that can be sampled on a finite computer. For many functions, their output is naturally discrete -e.g., a counting query -and there is no loss in accuracy. Otherwise, the function value must be rounded before adding noise.
The discrete Laplace distribution (a.k.a. two-sided geometric distribution) [GRS12; BV17] is the natural analog of the continuous Laplace distribution. That is, instead of a probability density of ε 2 · e −ε|x| at x ∈ R we have a probability mass of e ε −1 e ε +1 · e −ε|x| at x ∈ Z. The discrete Laplace distribution provides pure (ε, 0)-differential privacy and has many other desirable properties. The discrete Laplace distribution is used in the TopDown algorithm being developed to protect the data collected in the 2020 US Census [KCKHM18; Abo18].
The (continuous) Gaussian distribution has many advantages over the (continuous) Laplace distribution (and also some disadvantages). Thus it is natural to consider a discrete analog of the Gaussian distribution. In this article we study the discrete Gaussian -which we define next -in the context of differential privacy.
Definition 1. Let µ, σ ∈ R with σ > 0. The discrete Gaussian distribution with location µ and scale σ is denoted N Z µ, σ 2 . It is a probability distribution supported on the integers and defined by
(1)
Note that we exclusively consider µ ∈ Z; in this case, the distribution is symmetric and centered at µ. This is the natural discrete analog of the continuous Gaussian (which has density 1 √ 2πσ 2 · e −(x−µ) 2 /2σ 2 at x ∈ R) and it arises in lattice-based cryptography (in a multivariate form) [Ste17] .
In the following sections, we demonstrate three key properties of the discrete Gaussian:
• Privacy: Adding noise drawn from N Z 0, 1/ε 2 to an integer-valued sensitivity-1 query (e.g., a counting query) provides 1 2 ε 2 -concentrated differential privacy. This is the same guarantee that adding a draw from N (0, 1/ε 2 ) attains. In other words, the privacy guarantee is essentially the same as the continuous Gaussian.
• Utility: The discrete Gaussian attains the same or slightly better accuracy as the analogous continuous Gaussian. The variance of N Z 0, σ 2 is at most σ 2 and it also satisfies subgaussian tail bounds comparable to N (0, σ 2 ). We show numerically that the discrete Gaussian is better than rounding the continuous Gaussian to an integral value.
• Sampling: We can practically sample a discrete Gaussian on a finite computer. We present a simple and efficient exact sampling procedure that only requires access to random bits and does not involve any real operations or non-trivial function evaluations.
Privacy Analysis of the Discrete Gaussian
For completeness we state the definitions of differential privacy [DMNS06; DKMMN06] and concentrated differential privacy [DR16; BS16].
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if, for all x, x ∈ X n differing on a single element and all events E ⊂ Y, we have
Definition 3. A randomized algorithm M : X n → Y satisfies 1 2 ε 2 -concentrated differential privacy if, for all x, x ∈ X n differing on a single element and all α ∈ (1, ∞),
Note that (ε, 0)-differential privacy implies 1 2 ε 2 -concentrated differential privacy and 1 2 ε 2 -concentrated differential privacy implies 1 2 ε 2 + ε · 2 log(1/δ), δ -differential privacy for all δ > 0 [BS16] . The discrete Gaussian satisfies the following privacy property.
Theorem 4. Let q : X n → Z satisfy |q(x) − q(x )| ≤ 1 for all x, x ∈ X n differing on a single entry. Define a randomized algorithm M : X n → Z by M (x) = q(x) + Z where Z ← N Z 0, 1/ε 2 . Then M satisfies 1 2 ε 2 -concentrated differential privacy.
Theorem 4 follows from Proposition 5 and Definition 3 .
Proposition 5. Let σ, α ∈ R with σ > 0 and α ≥ 1. Let µ, ν ∈ Z. Then
(2)
Furthermore, this inequality is tight whenever α is an integer.
It is worth noting that the continuous Gaussian satisfies the same concentrated differential privacy bound, with equality for all Rényi divergence parameters:
Thus we see that the privacy guarantee of the discrete Gaussian is essentially identical to that of the continuous Gaussian with the same parameters.
To prove Proposition 5, we use the following technical lemma [J.G20].
By the Poisson summation formula [Poi; Wei], for every t ∈ R, we have
(This is the Fourier series representation of the 1-periodic function g : R → R given by g(t) = x∈Z e −(x+t) 2 /2σ 2 .) In particular, f (x) > 0 andf (x) > 0 for all x ∈ R. From this and the triangle inequality, we get
proving the lemma.
Proof of Proposition 5. Without loss of generality, ν = 0 and α > 1. Recalling that µ ∈ Z, we have
where the final inequality follows from Lemma 6. The inequality is an equality when αµ ∈ Z.
Utility of the Discrete Gaussian
We now consider how much noise the discrete Gaussian adds. As a comparison point, we consider both the continuous Gaussian and, in the interest of a fair comparison, the rounded Gaussiani.e., a sample from the continuous Gaussian rounded to the nearest integral value. In Figure 1 , we show how these compare numerically. We see numerically that the tail of the rounded Gaussian stochastically dominates that of the discrete Gaussian. In other words, the utility of the discrete Gaussian is strictly better than the rounded Gaussian (although not by much for reasonable values of σ, i.e., those which are not very small). To obtain analytic bounds, we begin by bounding the moment generating function:
For comparison, recall that the continuous Gaussian satisfies the same bound, but with equality: E X←N (0,σ 2 ) e tX = e t 2 σ 2 /2 for all t, σ ∈ R with σ > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 6,
The bound on the moment generating function yields bounds on the variance and tails:
Thus the variance of the discrete Gaussian is at most that of the corresponding continuous Gaussian and we also have subgaussian tail bounds. The variance of the discrete Gaussian is strictly less than that of the continuous Gaussian. However, this is only significant for σ → 0, which is not the regime of interest for applications to differential privacy.
Sampling from the Discrete Gaussian
We can efficiently sample exactly from a discrete Gaussian on a finite computer. In Figure 2 , we present a simple algorithm for doing so. A better algorithm is given in Appendix B. Faster algorithms are known [Kar16] , but we consider our methods to be simpler.
The idea is to first sample from a discrete Laplace distribution and then "convert" this into a discrete Gaussian by rejection sampling.
Theorem 9. The algorithm in Figure 2 produces a sample from N Z 0, σ 2 , where σ > 0 is the parameter given to the algorithm. The expected running time is O(σ + 1) operations. Furthermore, the algorithm can be implemented on a finite computer (e.g., a Turing machine) with access to unbiased random bits, assuming the parameter σ 2 has a reasonable representation (e.g., is rational).
Proof. To verify that our algorithm works, we must verify two things: First, we must show that, for each attempt (i.e., for each iteration of the outer loop), conditioned on success, the distribution of the output is as desired. Second, we must bound the probability that we succeed on an attempt. This ensures that the outer loop terminates quickly and we return something.
For the analysis, we will imagine the algorithm without the outer loop. Instead of rejecting and restarting the outer loop, it returns ⊥ to indicate failure. We will denote the event of successfully outputting a sample by . Thus we must show that P [Y = y | ] = e −y 2 /2σ 2 z∈Z e −z 2 /2σ 2 for all y ∈ Z and that P [ ] ≥ Ω(1).
Firstly, X follows a geometric distribution. Specifically, P [X = x] = (1 − e −τ ) · e −xτ for all x ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }. Thus P [(1 − 2B)X = y] = 1−e −τ 2 · e −|y|τ for all y ∈ Z \ {0}. There is a doublecounting problem at 0 -we get twice the desired probability, P [(1 − 2B)X = 0] = 1 − e −τ . Thus we reject if B = 1 and X = 0 to obtain the desired conditional probability:
Input: Parameter σ > 0. Output: One sample from N Z 0, σ 2 . Pick some arbitrary τ ∈ [1/(σ + 1), 1/σ].
(Pick something convenient. 2 ) Repeat until successful:
Initialize X ← 0. Repeat: Sample A ← Bernoulli(exp(−τ )). If A = 0, break the loop. If A = 1, set X ← X + 1 and continue. Sample B ← Bernoulli(1/2).
(X is geometric.) If B = 1 and X = 0, reject and restart.
(Y is now a discrete Laplace.) Sample C ← Bernoulli(exp(−(|Y | − τ σ 2 ) 2 /2σ 2 )). If C = 0, reject and restart. If C = 1, return Y as output.
(Success; Y is a discrete Gaussian.) 
where the penultimate inequality follows from τ ∈ [1/(σ + 1), 1/σ]. 2 To verify that the algorithm can be implemented on a finite computer, we inspect Figure 2 . The only non-trival step is sampling from Bernoulli(exp(−γ)) for various values of γ ≥ 0. In the appendix, we show that sampling from Bernoulli(exp(−γ)) can be reduced to sampling from Bernoulli(γ/k) for various integers k ≥ γ. Sampling from Bernoulli(γ) is then easy, assuming we are given a reasonable representation of γ ∈ [0, 1] (e.g., if γ is rational).
In terms of running time, the outer loop of the algorithm runs a constant number of times on average, since each run has a probability ≥ 1/10 of succeeding and, thus, terminating. The inner loop runs 1 + 1/(1 − e −τ ) ≤ 1 + 1/τ ≤ 2 + σ times on average and this dominates the overall running time. (The subroutine in the appendix for sampling from Bernoulli(exp(−γ)) can be made to run in constant expected time if we take sampling from Bernoulli(γ/k) to be a constant-time operation.)
Practical remark: We have implemented the algorithms from Figures 2, 3, and 4 in Python, setting τ = 1/(1 + σ ). We observe empirically that the success probability of each round of the algorithm is considerably higher than the bound of P [ ] ≥ 1/10 in the proof of Theorem 9, and increases for larger values of σ (i.e., the typical use case). We find that the success probability exceeds 6/10 for σ > 2. Overall, on a standard personal computer, our basic (non-optimized) implementation is able to produce at least 1000 samples per second for σ < 100, but (as expected) this degrades for larger σ. In Appendix B, we present a fast version of our algorithm whose running time has a much milder dependence on σ and our implementation produces over 350 samples per second even for σ = 10 100 .
Input: Parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. Output: One sample from Bernoulli(exp(−γ)). Set K ← 1. Repeat:
Sample A ← Bernoulli(γ/K).
If A = 0, break the loop. If A = 1, set K ← K + 1 and continue the loop. If K is odd, return 1. If K is even, return 0. Note that the procedure in Figure 3 only works for γ ∈ [0, 1]. For γ > 1, we can pick an integer ≥ γ and generate independent samples B 1 , · · · , B from Bernoulli(exp(−γ/ )) using the procedure. Then P [B 1 = B 2 = · · · = B = 1] = i=1 P [B i = 1] = exp(−γ/ ) = exp(−γ), which is the desired probability. (Alternatively, independently sample B 0 ← Bernoulli(exp(−(γ − γ )) and B 1 , · · · , B γ ← Bernoulli(exp(−1)) and then output γ i=0 B i .) This procedure avoids complex operations, such as computing the exponential function. Thus, for a rational γ, this can be implemented on a finite computer. Specifically, for n, d ∈ N, to sample Bernoulli(n/d) it suffices to draw D ∈ {1, 2, · · · , d} uniformly at random and output 1 if D ≤ n and output 0 if D > n.
For the analysis, we let A k denote the value of A in the k-th iteration of the loop in the algorithm. Then, for all k ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }, we have
Thus
B Faster Sampling of N Z 0, σ 2
The algorithm in Figure 2 runs in time linear in σ. In Figure 4 , we present a faster (albeit more complex) algorithm that requires O(1) operations on average. Specifically, if σ 2 is represented as a rational number (i.e., two integers in binary), then all operations run in time polynomial in the description length of σ 2 . Karney [Kar16] presents alternative fast algorithms.
Input: Parameter σ > 0. Output: One sample from N Z 0, σ 2 . Set t ← σ + 1 and τ ← 1/t. Repeat until successful: Sample X 0 ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , t − 1} uniformly at random. Sample D ← Bernoulli(exp(−X 0 /t)).
If D = 0, reject and restart. Initialize X 1 ← 0. Repeat: (Generate X 1 from Geometric(1 − e −1 ).) Sample A ← Bernoulli(exp(−1)). If A = 0, break the loop. If A = 1, set X 1 ← X 1 + 1 and continue.
If B = 1 and X = 0, reject and restart.
(Success; Y is a discrete Gaussian.) The algorithm in Figure 4 is similar to that in Figure 2 , and so is the analysis. We must show two things: (1) The distribution of X is still geometric -i.e., P [X = x] = (1 − e −τ ) · e −τ x for x ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }. (2) And the probability of success is still sufficient.
For the latter (2), we have P [D = 1] ≥ 1/e and, conditioned on D = 1, the probability of success is the same as before. Thus the probability of success on one attempt is P [ ] ≥ 1/10e. Now we analyze the distribution of X conditioned on accepting (i.e., D = 1). We have
as (x mod t)/t + x/t = x/t = τ · x. The normalizing constant can be ignored. If σ 2 is rational, then all operations are over rational numbers.
C Additional Results & Approximate Differential Privacy
In this section, we state (without proof) some additional results and facts on the discrete Gaussian. Proofs are available on request from the authors, and may appear in a future version of this paper.
Proposition 10 (Approximate Differential Privacy). Let σ > 0 and ε > 0. Then adding N Z 0, σ 2 to a integer-valued sensitivity-1 function provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy for
And this is the smallest possible value of δ for which this is true.
The same result holds if we replace the discrete Gaussian with the continuous Gaussian.
We have some analytic upper bounds: Firstly, δ ≤ e − εσ 2 2 /2σ 2 / √ 2πσ 2 , where · denotes rounding to the nearest integer. Furthermore, if ε > 1 2σ 2 and εσ 2 + 1/2 / ∈ N, then
In Figure 5 , we empirically compare the optimal δ (given by Proposition 10) to this analytic upper bound, an upper bound entailed by concentrated differential privacy, and the bound attained by the corresponding continuous Gaussian. We see that the upper bounds are reasonably tight. The discrete and continuous Gaussian attain almost identical guarantees for large σ, but the discretization creates a small difference that becomes apparent for small σ. Next we consider bounds on the utility of the discrete Gaussian. [X] ≤ 3 · e −1/(2σ 2 ) .
Proposition 12 (Universal Variance Lower Bound). Let X be a random variable/distribution such that D 2 (X + 1 X) ≤ ε 2 , where X +1 represents the distribution shifted by 1. Then Var [X] ≥ 1 e ε 2 −1 . By Proposition 5, N Z 0, 1/ε 2 satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition 12. Thus, for all σ > 0,
Var X←N Z (0,σ 2 )
[X] ≥ 1 e 1/σ 2 − 1 .
However, we emphasize that Proposition 12 applies to any distribution providing 1 2 ε 2 -concentrated differential privacy, not just the discrete and continuous Gaussians. Note that, as σ → ∞, the upper and lower both converge to σ 2 · (1 − o(1)).
Finally, we provide some tail bounds on the discrete Gaussian, expressed relative to the continuous and rounded Gaussians. 
